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ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE
PETER G. KLEIN
In his “closing salvo” in the socialist calculation debate, Mises (1949, pp.705–10) argued that the market socialists failed to understand the role offinancial markets in an industrial economy. Even with markets for consumer
goods, he explained, socialism would fail because it substituted collective owner-
ship of the means of production for private capital markets. Through these
markets, owners of financial capital decide which firms, and which industries,
receive resources to make consumer goods. In a modern economy, most produc-
tion takes place in publicly held corporations. Of prime importance, then, is the
problem of corporate governance: How do owners of financial capital structure
their agreements with those who receive that capital, to prevent its misuse?
Unfortunately, there exists little research in this area from an Austrian perspective.
In this article, I focus on the financial-market entrepreneur—what Rothbard
(1962, 1985) calls the capitalist–entrepreneur—to outline some features of an
Austrian theory of corporate governance. I begin by reviewing the traditional,
production-function theory of the firm and suggesting two alternative perspec-
tives: that of the entrepreneur and that of the capitalist. I next discuss the Coasian,
or “contractual” approach to the firm and argue that it provides a useful organizing
framework for Austrian research on the firm. The subsequent section proposes
entrepreneurship and economic calculation as building blocks for an Austrian
theory of the firm. Finally, after a brief review of capital-market behavior and the
disciplinary role of takeovers, I outline four areas for Austrian research in corporate
governance: firms as investments, internal capital markets, comparative corporate
governance, and financiers as entrepreneurs.
THE TRADITIONAL THEORY OF THE FIRM
In economics textbooks, the “firm” is a production function or production possi-
bilities set, a “black box” that transforms inputs into outputs. Given the existing
state of technology, the prices of inputs, and a demand schedule, the firm
maximizes money profits subject to the constraint that its production plans must
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be technologically feasible. The firm is modeled as a single actor, facing a series of
uncomplicated decisions: what level of output to produce, how much of each
factor to hire, and the like. These “decisions,” of course, are not really decisions at
all; they are trivial mathematical calculations, implicit in the underlying data. In the
long run, the firm may choose an optimal size and output mix, but even these are
determined by the characteristics of the production function (economies of scale,
scope, and sequence). In short: the firm is a set of cost curves, and the “theory of
the firm” is a calculus problem.
While descriptively vacuous, the production–function approach has the ap-
peal of analytical tractability along with its elegant parallel to neoclassical con-
sumer theory (profit maximization is like utility maximization, isoquants are indiffer-
ence curves, and so on). Nonetheless, many economists now see it as increasingly
unsatisfactory, as unable to account for a variety of real-world business practices:
vertical and lateral integration, mergers, geographic and product-line diversification,
franchising, long-term commercial contracting, transfer pricing, research joint
ventures, and many others. The inadequacy of the traditional theory of the firm
explains much of the recent interest in agency theory, transaction cost economics,
the capabilities approach, and other facets of the “new institutional economics.”1
A more serious problem with the traditional theory, however, has received less
attention. The theory of profit maximization is nearly always told from the perspec-
tive of the manager, the agent who operates the plant, not that of the owner, who
supplies the capital to fund the plant. Yet owners control how much authority to
delegate to operational managers, so capitalists are the ultimate decisionmakers.
To understand the firm, then, we must focus on the actions and plans of the
suppliers of financial capital.
Focusing on capital markets and the corporate governance problem highlights
a fundamental analytical problem with the traditional approach to the theory of
the firm. In the production-function approach, money capital is treated as a factor
of production. The manager’s objective is to maximize the difference between
total revenues and total costs, with the cost of capital treated simply as another
cost (and typically assumed to be exogenous). The residual, “profit,” is retained by
the manager. Hence financial capital receives scant attention. As discussed below,
this can be a serious flaw.
TWO ALTERNATIVE PERSPECTIVES
What, then, is the proper way to understand the business firm? Two alternative
perspectives deserve consideration. The first perspective, which has received
substantial attention in the Austrian literature, is that of the entrepreneur, or what
Mises (1949, pp. 254–55) calls the “entrepreneur–promoter.” Entrepreneurship,
in the Misesian sense, is the act of bearing uncertainty. Production unfolds through
time, and thus the entrepreneur must purchase factors of production in the present
(paying today’s prices, which are known), in anticipation of revenues from the
future sale of the product (at tomorrow’s prices, which are uncertain). En-
trepreneurial profit or loss is the difference between these revenues and the initial
outlays, less the general rate of interest. As such, profit is the reward for successfully
bearing uncertainty. Successful promoters make accurate forecasts of future
1For recent surveys of this literature see Furubotn and Richter (1997), and Klein (1998a).
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prices and receive returns greater than their outlays. Those whose forecasts are
less accurate earn losses. Promoters who systematically make poor forecasts
quickly find themselves unable to secure any further resources for investment and
eventually exit the market.
The second perspective is that of the capitalist, the owner of the firm. Ownership
can also be thought of as a factor of production—what Rothbard (1962, pp. 538–41)
calls the “decisionmaking factor”—but it is different from the other factors. In an
ownership approach, money capital is treated as a unique factor of production, the
“controlling factor”; the investor is both ultimate decisionmaker and residual
claimant. The firm’s objective is to maximize the return on the owner’s investment.
Because the owner delegates certain functions to managers, a central focus of the
theory of the firm becomes the problem of corporate governance: How do
suppliers of capital structure their arrangements with managers in a way that
maximizes their returns?
This article argues that the most interesting problems in the theory of the firm
relate to the intersection between the entrepreneurial function and the capitalist
function. Indeed, as Mises argued, the driving force behind the market economy is
a particular type of entrepreneur, the capitalist–entrepreneur, who risks his money
capital in anticipation of future, uncertain, returns. Moreover, as discussed below,
the entrepreneur is nearly always also a capitalist, and the capitalist is also an
entrepreneur. 
Economists now increasingly recognize the importance of the capitalist in the
direction of the firm’s affairs. In the introduction to his influential book Strong
Managers, Weak Owners, Mark Roe (1994, p. vii) makes the point succinctly:
Economic theory once treated the firm as a collection of machinery, technology,
inventory, workers, and capital. Dump these inputs into a black box, stir them up, and
one got outputs of products and profits. Today, theory sees the firm as more, as a
management structure. The firm succeeds if managers can successfully coordinate the
firm’s activities; it fails if managers cannot effectively coordinate and match people
and inputs to current technologies and markets. At the very top of the firm are the
relationships among the firm’s shareholders, its directors, and its senior managers. If
those relationships are dysfunctional, the firm is more likely to stumble.
As Roe suggests, the relationships between the firm’s owners (shareholders) and
its top managers are centrally important in determining firm performance.2
THE CONTRACTUAL APPROACH
Both the entrepreneurial perspective and the ownership perspective can be
understood from within the “contractual” framework associated with Coase
(1937). Coase was the first to explain that the boundaries of the organization depend
not only on the productive technology, but on the costs of transacting business. In the
Coasian framework, as developed and expanded by Williamson (1975, 1985, 1996),
Klein, Crawford, and Alchian (1978), Grossman and Hart (1986), Hart and Moore
(1990), and others, the decision to organize transactions within the firm as
opposed to on the open market—the “make or buy decision”—depends on the
2For recent surveys of the literature on corporate governance see Gilson (1995), Shleifer and
Vishny (1997), and Zingales (1998).
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relative costs of internal versus external exchange. The market mechanism entails
certain costs: discovering the relevant prices, negotiating and enforcing contracts,
and so on. Within the firm, the entrepreneur may be able to reduce these
“transaction costs” by coordinating these activities himself. However, internal
organization brings other kinds of transaction costs, namely problems of informa-
tion flow, incentives, monitoring, and performance evaluation. The boundary of
the firm, then, is determined by the tradeoff, at the margin, between the relative
transaction costs of external and internal exchange. In this sense, firm boundaries
depend not only on technology, but on organizational considerations; that is, on
the costs and benefits of various contracting alternatives.
Economic organization, both internal and external, imposes costs because
complex contracts are usually incomplete. The transaction-cost literature makes
much of the distinction between complete and incomplete contracts. A complete
contract specifies a course of action, a decision, or terms of trade contingent on
every possible future state of affairs. In textbook models of competitive general
equilibrium, all contracts are assumed to be complete. The future is not known
with certainty, but the probability distributions of all possible future events are
known.3 In an important sense, the model is “timeless”: all relevant future contin-
gencies are considered in the ex ante contracting stage, so there are no decisions
to be made as the future unfolds.
The Coasian approach relaxes this assumption and holds that complete,
contingent contracts are not always feasible. In a world of “true” (structural, rather
than parametric) uncertainty, the future holds genuine surprises (Foss 1993a), and
this limits the available contracting options. In simple transactions—for instance,
procurement of an off-the-shelf component—uncertainty may be relatively unim-
portant, and spot-market contracting works well. For more complex transactions,
such as the purchase and installation of specialized equipment, the underlying
agreements will typically be incomplete—the contract will provide remedies for
only some possible future contingencies.4 One example is a relational contract, an
agreement that describes shared goals and a set of general principles that govern
the relationship (Goldberg 1980). Another is an implicit contract—an agreement
that while unstated, is presumably understood by all sides.5 Regardless, contrac-
tual incompleteness exposes the contracting parties to certain risks. In particular,
investment in relationship-specific assets exposes agents to a potential “holdup”
problem: If circumstances change, their trading partners may try to expropriate the
rents accruing to the specific assets. Suppose an upstream supplier tailors its
equipment to service a particular customer. After the equipment is in place, the
customer may demand a lower price, knowing that the salvage value of the
specialized equipment is lower than the net payment it offers. Anticipating this
possibility, the supplier will be unwilling to install the custom machinery without
3What Knight (1921) would describe as “risk,” rather than “uncertainty.”
4Williamson (1975, 1985) attributes contractual incompleteness to cognitive limits or “bounded
rationality,” following Simon’s (1961, p. xxiv) interpretation of human action as “intendedly rational,
but only limitedly so.” Other economists are more agnostic, assuming only that some quantities or
outcomes are unobservable (or not verifiable to third parties, such as the courts), in which case
contracts cannot be made contingent on these variables or outcomes.
5This is the sense in which Kreps (1990) understands “corporate culture.”
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protection for such a contingency, even if the specialized technology would make
the relationship more profitable for both sides.
One way to safeguard rents accruing to specific assets is vertical (or lateral)
integration, where a merger eliminates any adversarial interests. Less extreme
options include long-term contracts (Joskow 1985, 1987, 1988, 1990), partial
ownership agreements (Pisano, Russo, and Teece 1988; Pisano 1990), or agree-
ments for both parties to invest in offsetting relationship-specific investments
(Heide and John 1988). Overall, parties may employ several governance struc-
tures. The Coasian literature tries to match the appropriate governance structure
with the particular characteristics of the transaction.
There is some debate within the Austrian literature about whether the basic
Coasian approach is compatible with Austrian economics. O’Driscoll and Rizzo
(1985, p. 124), while acknowledging Coase’s approach as an “excellent static
conceptualization of the problem,” argue that a more evolutionary framework is
needed to understand how firms respond to change. Some Austrian econo-
mists have suggested that the Coasian framework may be too narrow, too
squarely in the general-equilibrium tradition to deal adequately with Austrian
concerns (Boudreaux and Holcombe 1989; Langlois 1994). However, as Foss
(1993b) has pointed out, there are “two Coasian traditions.” One tradition, the
moral-hazard or agency-theoretic branch associated with Alchian and Demsetz
(1972), studies the design of ex-ante mechanisms to limit shirking when supervi-
sion is costly. Here the emphasis is on monitoring and incentives in an (exo-
genously determined) agency relationship. The above criticisms may apply to
this branch of the modern literature, but they do not apply to the other tradition,
the governance or asset-specificity branch, especially in Williamson’s more
heterodox formulation. Williamson’s transaction cost framework incorporates
non-maximizing behavior (bounded rationality); true, “structural” uncertainty or
genuine surprise (complete contracts are held not to be feasible, meaning that not
all ex-post contingencies can be contracted upon ex ante); and process or adapta-
tion over time (trading relationships develop over time, typically undergoing a
“fundamental transformation” that changes the terms of trade). In short, “at least
some modern theories of the firm do not at all presuppose the ‘closed’ economic
universe—with all relevant inputs and outputs being given, human action concep-
tualized as maximization, etc.—that [some critics] claim are underneath the con-
temporary theory of the firm” (Foss 1993a, p. 274). Stated differently, one can
adopt an essentially Coasian perspective without abandoning the Knightian or
Austrian view of the entrepreneur as an uncertainty-bearing, innovating decision-
maker.6
BUILDING BLOCKS OF AN AUSTRIAN THEORY OF THE FIRM
Beginning with the basic Coasian or contractual framework, we can add two
elements as building blocks to an Austrian theory of the firm: entrepreneurship
and economic calculation. Entrepreneurship represents the bearing of uncer-
tainty. Economic calculation is the tool entrepreneurs use to assess costs and
expected future benefits. Consider each in turn.
6Foss and Foss (1998) argue, more generally, that contractual and “knowledge-based” theories
of the firm are fundamentally complements, not rivals.
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Entrepreneurship
Entrepreneurship, in the Misesian sense, is the act of bearing uncertainty. In an
ever-changing world, decisions must be made based on expectations of future
events. Because production takes time, resources must be invested before the
returns on those investments are realized. If the forecast of future returns is
inaccurate, the expected profits will turn out to be losses. This is, of course, true not
only of financial investors, but of all human actors. If the future were known with
certainty, man would not act, since his action would not change the future. Thus,
all purposeful human action carries some risk that the means chosen will not bring
about the desired end. In this sense, all human actors are entrepreneurs.
Austrians tend to focus on this kind of pure entrepreneurship, the entrepreneurial
aspect of all human behavior. In doing so, however, they often overlook a particular
case of entrepreneurship, the driving force behind the structure of production: the
capitalist–entrepreneur, who risks his money capital in anticipation of future events.
Kirzner’s (1973, 1979) influential interpretation of Mises identifies “alertness” or “discov-
ery,” rather than uncertainty bearing, as the defining property of entrepreneurship. In
Kirzner’s framework, entrepreneurial profit is the reward to superior alertness to
profit opportunities. The simplest case is that of the arbitrageur, who discovers a
discrepancy in present prices that can be exploited for financial gain. In a more
typical case, the entrepreneur is alert to a new product or a superior production
process and steps in to fill this market gap before others.
Kirzner’s formulation has been criticized, however, for a lack of attention to
uncertainty. According to this criticism, mere alertness to a profit opportunity is
not sufficient for earning profits. To reap financial gain, the entrepreneur must
invest resources to realize the discovered profit opportunity. “Entrepreneurial
ideas without money are mere parlor games until the money is obtained and
committed to the projects” (Rothbard, 1985, p. 283). Moreover, excepting the few
cases where buying low and selling high are nearly instantaneous (say, electronic
trading of currencies or commodity futures), even arbitrage transactions require
some time to complete. The selling price may fall before the arbitrageur has made
his sale, and thus even the pure arbitrageur faces some probability of loss. In
Kirzner’s formulation, the worst that can happen to an entrepreneur is the failure to
discover an existing profit opportunity. Entrepreneurs either earn profits or break
even, but it is unclear how they suffer losses.
Kirzner (1997, p. 72) argues, more recently, that entrepreneurs can earn losses
when they misread market conditions. “[E]ntrepreneurial boldness and imagina-
tion can lead to pure entrepreneurial losses as well as to pure profit. Mistaken
actions by entrepreneurs mean that they have misread the market, possibly
pushing price and output constellations in directions not equilibrative.” But even
this formulation makes it clear that it is mistaken actions—not mistaken discover-
ies—that lead to loss. Misreading market conditions leads to losses only if the
entrepreneur has invested resources in a project based on this misreading. It is the
failure to anticipate future market conditions correctly that causes the loss. It
seems obscure to describe this as erroneous discovery, rather than unsuccessful
uncertainty bearing.7
7In his defense, it should be noted that Kirzner’s (1997) remarks appear in the context of defend-
ing the equilibrating tendency of markets, against the Walrasian picture of instantaneous market
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Mises, by contrast, consistently identifies entrepreneurship with both profit
and loss. “There is a simple rule of thumb to tell entrepreneurs from non-entrepre-
neurs. The entrepreneurs are those on whom the incidence of losses on the capital
employed falls” (Mises 1951, p. 112). Moreover, while Mises indeed acknow-
ledges the element of entrepreneurship in all human action, it is clear that the
potential losses of the capitalist–entrepreneurs are particularly important:
Mises applies the concept of the entrepreneur to all cases of uncertainty-bearing, and
since laborers face uncertainty in deciding where to move or what occupation to go
into, laborers are also entrepreneurs. But the most important case of entrepreneurship,
the driving force in shaping the actual structure and patterns of production in the
market economy, are the capitalist–entrepreneurs, the ones who commit and risk their
capital in deciding when, what, and how much to produce. The capitalists, too, are far
more subject to actual monetary losses than are the laborers. (Rothbard 1985, p. 282)8
Mises is careful to distinguish entrepreneurship from management, the carrying
out of those tasks specified by the capitalist–entrepreneur. “[T]hose who confuse
entrepreneurship and management close their eyes to the economic problem”
Mises 1949, p. 708). It is the capitalist–entrepreneurs who control the allocation of
capital to the various branches of industry.
It is clear from this formulation that the capitalist–entrepreneur must own prop-
erty. He cannot invest without prior ownership of financial capital. Menger’s (1871,
pp. 159–61) treatment of production includes as entrepreneurial functions eco-
nomic calculation, the “act of will,” and “supervision of the execution of the production
plan.” These functions “entail property ownership and, therefore, mark the Mengerian
entrepreneur as a capitalist–entrepreneur” (Salerno 1999, p. 30). Menger describes
“command of the services of capital” as a “necessary prerequisite” for economic
activity. Even in large firms, although he may employ “several helpers,” the entrepre-
neur himself continues to bear uncertainty, perform economic calculation, and
supervise production, even if these functions “are ultimately confined . . . to determining
the allocation of portions of wealth to particular productive purposes only by general
categories, and to selection and control of persons” (Menger 1871, pp. 160–61;
quoted in Salerno 1999, p. 30).9 An Austrian theory of the firm, then, is essentially a
theory about the ownership and use of capital. As Yu (1998, p. 7) puts it, “the
Austrian firm is a collection of capital resources.”
Unfortunately, the Austrian literature on the firm often confuses entrepreneur-
ship with innovation, strategic planning, leadership, and other functions more
properly associated with management than ownership. Witt (1998a,b), for exam-
ple, describes entrepreneurship as a form of “cognitive leadership.” Witt (1998b)
outlines a potential Austrian theory of the firm by combining recent literature on
cognitive psychology with Kirzner’s concept of entrepreneurship. Entrepreneurs
require complementary factors of production, he argues, which are coordinated
within the firm. For the firm to be successful, the entrepreneur must establish a
adjustment. Still, the defense could perhaps be made equally well without reference to the discovery
metaphor.
8It should be noted that bondholders, as well as equity holders, are partly entrepreneurs, since
even bondholders bear some default risk.
9For more on Misesian entrepreneurship and its various interpretations, see also Salerno (1993,
pp. 116–33) and Kirzner (1996).
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tacit, shared framework of goals—what the management literature terms “leader-
ship.” A proper Austrian theory of the firm, then, must take account of the ways in
which entrepreneurs communicate their business conceptions within the organi-
zation.
The problem with this argument is that while organizational leadership is
undoubtedly important, it is not particularly “entrepreneurial.” Entrepreneurship
has little necessarily to do with having a business plan, communicating a “corpo-
rate culture,” or other dimensions of business leadership; these are attributes of
the successful manager, who may or may not be an entrepreneur.10 Moreover,
even if top-level managerial skill were the same as entrepreneurship, it is unclear
why “cognitive leadership”—tacit communication of shared modes of thought,
core capabilities, and the like—should be more entrepreneurial than other, com-
paratively mundane managerial tasks such as structuring incentives, limiting op-
portunism, administering rewards, and so on.
Economic Calculation
All entrepreneurs, particularly capitalist–entrepreneurs, use economic calcula-
tion as their primary decisionmaking tool. By economic calculation we simply
mean the use of present prices and anticipated future prices to compare present costs
with expected future benefits. In this way, the entrepreneur decides what goods and
services should be produced, and what methods of production should be used to
produce them. “The business of the entrepreneur is not merely to experiment with
new technological methods, but to select from the multitude of technologically
feasible methods those which are best fit to supply the public in the cheapest way
with the things they are asking for most urgently” (Mises 1951, p. 110). To make
this selection, the entrepreneur must be able to weigh the costs and expected
benefits of various courses of action.
The need for economic calculation places ultimate limits on the size of the
organization (Klein 1996). Indeed, many writers have recognized the connections
between the socialist calculation debate and the problems of internal organization
(Montias 1976; Williamson 1991). Kirzner, for example, interprets the costs of
internal organization in terms of Hayek’s knowledge problem:
In a free market, any advantages that may be derived from “central planning” . . . are
purchased at the price of an enhanced knowledge problem. We may expect firms to
spontaneously expand to the point where additional advantages of “central” planning
are just offset by the incremental knowledge difficulties that stem from dispersed
information. (Kirzner  1992, p. 162)
What, precisely, drives this knowledge problem? The mainstream literature on
the firm focuses mostly on the costs of market exchange, and much less on the
costs of governing internal exchange. The new research has yet to produce a fully
satisfactory explanation of the limits to firm size (Williamson 1985, chap. 6). In
Coase’s words, “Why does the entrepreneur not organize one less transaction or one
more?” Or, more generally, “Why is not all production carried on in one big firm?”
10One distinction between entrepreneurship (as uncertainty bearing) and management is that
managerial functions can be purchased on the market: innovation can be outsourced to R&D labs;
strategic planning can be contracted out to consultants; corporate identities, both internal and exter-
nal, can be developed and communicated by outside specialists; and so on. 
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(Coase 1937, pp. 42–43). Existing contractual explanations rely on problems of
authority and responsibility (Arrow 1974); incentive distortions caused by residual
ownership rights (Grossman and Hart 1986; Holmström and Tirole 1989; Hart and
Moore 1990); and the costs of attempting to reproduce market governance features
within the firm (Williamson 1985, chap. 6). Rothbard (1962, pp. 544–50) offered an
explanation for the firm’s vertical boundaries based on Mises’s claim that eco-
nomic calculation under socialism is impossible. Rothbard argued that the need
for monetary calculation in terms of actual prices not only explains the failures of
central planning under socialism, but places an upper bound on firm size.
Rothbard’s account begins with the recognition that Mises’s position on
socialist economic calculation is not exclusively, or even primarily, about socialism.
It is about the role of prices for capital goods. Entrepreneurs allocate resources
based on their expectations about future prices, and the information contained in
present prices. To make profits, they need information about all prices, not only the
prices of consumer goods but the prices of factors of production. Without markets
for capital goods, these goods can have no prices, and hence entrepreneurs
cannot make judgments about the relative scarcities of these factors. In any
environment, then—socialist or not—where a factor of production has no market
price, a potential user of that factor will be unable to make rational decisions about
its use. Stated this way, Mises’s claim is simply that efficient resource allocation in a
market economy requires well-functioning asset markets. To have such markets,
factors of production must be privately owned.
Rothbard’s contribution was to generalize Mises’s analysis of this problem under
socialism to the context of vertical integration and the size of the organization. Rothbard
writes in Man, Economy, and State that up to a point, the size of the firm is determined by
costs, as in the textbook model. However, “the ultimate limits are set on the relative size of
the firm by the necessity for markets to exist in every factor, in order to make it possible
for the firm to calculate its profits and losses” (Rothbard 1962, p. 536). This argument
hinges on the notion of “implicit costs.” The market value of opportunity costs for factor
services—what Rothbard calls “estimates of implicit incomes”—can be determined
only if there are external markets for those factors (pp. 542–44). For example, if an
entrepreneur hires himself to manage the business, the opportunity cost of his labor
must be included in the firm’s costs. Yet, without an actual market for the entrepre-
neur’s managerial services, he will be unable to figure out his opportunity cost; his
balance sheets will therefore be less accurate than they would if he could measure
his opportunity cost.
The same problem affects a firm owning multiple stages of production. A large,
integrated firm is typically organized into semi-autonomous profit centers, each
specializing in a particular final or intermediate product. The central management of
the firm uses the implicit incomes of the business units, as reflected in statements of
divisional profit and loss, to allocate physical and financial capital across the divisions.
To compute divisional profits and losses, the firm needs an economically meaningful
transfer price for all internally transferred goods and services. If there is an external
market for the component, the firm can use that market price as the transfer price.
Without a market price, however, the transfer price must be estimated, either on a
cost-plus basis or by bargaining between the buying and selling divisions (Gabor
1984; Eccles and White 1988; King 1994). Such estimated transfer prices contain
less information than actual market prices.
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The use of internally traded intermediate goods for which no external market
reference is available thus introduces distortions that reduce organizational effi-
ciency. This gives us the element missing from contemporary theories of eco-
nomic organization, an upper bound: the firm is constrained by the need for
external markets for all internally traded goods. In other words, no firm can
become so large that it is both the unique producer and user of an intermediate
product; for then no market-based transfer prices will be available, and the firm will
be unable to calculate divisional profit and loss and therefore unable to allocate
resources correctly between divisions.11 Of course, internal organization does
avoid the holdup problem, which the firm would face if there were a unique
outside supplier; conceivably, this benefit could outweigh the increase in “incalcu-
lability” (Rothbard 1962, p. 548). Usually, however, the costs from the loss of
calculation will likely exceed the costs of external governance.12
Like Kirzner (1992), Rothbard viewed his contribution as consistent with the
basic Coasian framework. In a later elaboration of this argument, he states that his
own treatment of the limits of the firm
serves to extend the notable analysis of Professor Coase on the market determinants
of the size of the firm, or the relative extent of corporate planning within the firm as
against the use of exchange and the price mechanism. Coase pointed out that there
are diminishing benefits and increasing costs to each of these two alternatives,
resulting, as he put it, in an “‘optimum’ amount of planning” in the free-market system.
Our thesis adds that the costs of internal corporate planning become prohibitive as
soon as markets for capital goods begin to disappear, so that the free-market optimum
will always stop well short not only of One Big Firm throughout the world market but
also of any disappearance of specific markets and hence of economic calculation in
that product or resource. (Rothbard 1976, p. 76)
“Central planning” within the firm, then, is possible only when the firm exists within
a larger market setting.13
11Note that in general, Rothbard is making a claim only about the upper bound of the firm, not
the incremental cost of expanding the firm’s activities (as long as external market references are
available). As soon as the firm expands to the point where at least one external market has disap-
peared, however, the calculation problem exists. The difficulties become worse as more and more
external markets disappear, as “islands of noncalculable chaos swell to the proportions of masses and
continents. As the area of incalculability increases, the degrees of irrationality, misallocation, loss,
impoverishment, etc., become greater” (Rothbard 1962, p. 548).
12Similarly, Rothbard’s claim is not that because external prices are necessary for large firms to
function efficiently, firms will tend to become large where external markets are “thick” or better
developed. On the contrary, large firms typically arise precisely where external markets are poorly
developed or hampered by government intervention; these are the kinds of circumstances that give
entrepreneurs an advantage in coordinating activities internally (Chandler 1977). However, such
firms are still constrained by the need for some external market reference.
13Ironically, the only reason the Soviet Union and the communist nations of Eastern Europe
could exist at all is that they never fully succeeded in establishing socialism worldwide, so they could
use world market prices to establish implicit prices for the goods they bought and sold internally
(Rothbard, 1991, pp. 73–74). As Mises (1949, pp. 702–03) observes, “[w]ithout the aid of [world]
prices their actions would have been aimless and planless. Only because they were able to refer to
these foreign prices were they able to calculate, to keep books, and to prepare their much talked
about plans.” Indeed, traditional command-style economies, such as that of the former U.S.S.R.,
appear to be able only to mimic those tasks that market economies have performed before; they are
unable to set up and execute original tasks (Ericson 1991, p. 21).
28 THE QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF AUSTRIAN ECONOMICS VOL. 2, NO. 2 (SUMMER 1999)
Rothbard’s argument about the limits to firm size has several implications for
research in industrial organization and business strategy. First, all else equal, firms
able to use market-based transfer prices should eventually outperform firms using
administered or negotiated transfer prices. Second, innovation should be particu-
larly difficult in industries where few of the relevant manufacturing capabilities
exist in the market (Langlois and Robertson 1995). Because innovating firms are
more likely to be using unique intermediate goods and production processes,
innovation carries with its benefits the cost of more severe internal distortions.
Economic calculation is then another obstacle the innovator must overcome.
Third, the allocation of overhead or fixed cost across divisions will be particularly
problematic. If an input is essentially indivisible (or nonexcludable), then there is
no way to compute the opportunity cost of just the portion of the input used by a
particular division (see Rogerson 1992, for a discussion of these problems).14 Firms
with high overhead costs should thus be at a disadvantage relative to firms able to
allocate costs more precisely between business units. In the literature on cost
accounting there has been some recent interest in “market simulation accounting”
(Staubus 1986), by which firms try to assess the price at which an asset would trade
in an active market, based on observed market prices and related information.
Rothbard’s position on the limits to firm size suggests that the market simulation
approach may prove a useful accounting technique.
CAPITAL MARKETS
If the capitalist–entrepreneur is the driving force behind the industrialized, market
economy, then economists should focus their attention on the financial markets,
the capitalist–entrepreneur’s main venue. It is here that this most important form of
entrepreneurship takes place. Of course, in the traditional, production–function
theory of the firm, capital markets do little but supply financial capital to managers,
who can get as much capital as they wish at the going market price. In a more
sophisticated understanding, managers do not decide how much capital they
want; capitalists decide where capital should be allocated. In doing so, they
provide essential discipline to the plant-level manager, whom Mises (1949, p. 304)
calls the entrepreneur’s “junior partner.”
When capitalists supply resources to firms, they usually delegate to managers
the day-to-day responsibility for use of those resources. Managers may thus be
able to use those resources to benefit themselves, rather than the capitalist. The
problem of managerial discretion—what we now call the principal–agent prob-
lem—occupies much current research in the theory of the firm. Under what conditions
can managers exercise discretionary behavior? What kinds of rules, or mechanisms,
can be designed to align the manager’s interest with the owner’s? Without effective
rules, what actions will managers choose? An early application was the proposed
“separation of ownership and control” in the modern corporation. Berle and
Means (1932) argued that the modern firm is run not by its owners, the share-hold-
ers, but by salaried managers, whose interests are different from those of share-
holders and include executive perks, prestige, and similar rewards. If the corpora-
tion is diffusely held, no individual shareholder has sufficient motivation to engage
in (costly) monitoring managerial decisions, and therefore discretion will flourish at
14Mises (1944, p. 32) recognized the problem of allocating overhead costs, mentioning this as a
possible exception to the notion that divisional accounting costs can reflect “true” costs.
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the expense of the market value of the firm. However, Berle and Means did not
consider how owners might limit this discretion ex ante, without the need for
detailed ex post monitoring.
Agency theory—now the standard language of corporate finance—addresses
these problems. As developed by Jensen and Meckling (1976), Fama (1980), Fama
and Jensen (1983), and Jensen (1986), agency theory studies the design of ex-ante
incentive-compatible mechanisms to reduce agency costs in the face of potential
moral hazard (malfeasance) by agents. Agency costs are defined by Jensen and
Meckling (1976, p. 308) as the sum of “(1) the monitoring expenditures of the
principal, (2) the bonding expenditures by the agent, and (3) the residual loss.” The
residual loss represents the potential gains from trade that fail to be realized
because perfect incentives for agents cannot be provided when the agent’s
actions are unobservable. In a typical agency model, a principal assigns an agent
to do some task (producing output, for instance), but has only an imperfect signal
of the agent’s performance (for example, effort). The agency problem is analogous
to the signal-extraction problem popularized in macroeconomics by Lucas (1972):
how much of the observable outcome is due to the agent’s effort, and how much is
due to factors beyond the agent’s control? The optimal incentive contract balances
the principal’s desire to provide incentives to increase the agent’s effort (for
example, by basing compensation on the outcome) with the agent’s desire to be
insured from the fluctuations in compensation that come from these random
factors.
Owners of corporations (shareholders) use a variety of control or governance
mechanisms to limit the managerial discretion described by Berle and Means.
Both “internal” and “external” governance may be employed. Internally, owners
may establish a board of directors to oversee the actions of managers. They can
use performance-based compensation to motivate managers to act in the owners’
interest (for instance, giving managers stock options instead of cash bonuses).
They can adopt a particular organizational form, such as the “M-form” structure, in
which managerial discretion is more easily kept in check (Williamson 1975).
Finally, they can rely on competition within the firm for top-level management
positions—what Fama (1980) calls the internal market for managers—to limit the
discretionary behavior of top-level management. 
Even more important are external forces that help align managers’ interests
with those of shareholders. Competition in the product market, for example,
assures that firms whose managers engage in too much discretionary behavior will
fail, costing the managers their jobs. In countries where universal banking is
permitted, large equity holders such as banks can exercise considerable influence
over managerial behavior. The external governance mechanism that has received
the most attention, however, is the market for ownership itself, the “market for
corporate control.”
Henry Manne’s essay, “Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control”
(1965), responded to Berle and Means by noting that managerial discretion will be
limited if there is an active market for control of corporations. When managers
engage in discretionary behavior, the share price of the firm falls, and this invites
takeover and subsequent replacement of incumbent management. Therefore,
while managers may hold considerable autonomy over the day-to-day operations
of the firm, the stock market places strict limits on their behavior.
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Mises makes the same general point in the passage in Human Action (1949)
distinguishing what he calls “profit management” from “bureaucratic manage-
ment” (pp. 308–11). It is true, Mises acknowledges, that the salaried managers of a
corporation hold considerable autonomy over the day-to-day operations of the
firm. Nonetheless, the shareholders make the ultimate decisions about allocating
resources to the firm, in their decisions to buy and sell stock:
[The Berle–Means] doctrine disregards entirely the role that the capital and money
market, the stock and bond exchange, which a pertinent idiom simply calls the
“market,” plays in the direction of corporate business. . . . [T]he changes in the prices of
common and preferred stock and of corporate bonds are the means applied by the
capitalists for the supreme control of the flow of capital. The price structure as
determined by the speculations on the capital and money markets and on the big
commodity exchanges not only decides how much capital is available for the conduct
of each corporation’s business; it creates a state of affairs to which the managers must
adjust their operations in detail. Mises 1949, p. 303)
Mises does not identify the takeover mechanism per se as a means for capitalists to
exercise control—takeovers were much less popular before the late 1950s, when
the tender offer began to replace the proxy contest as the acquisition method of
choice—but the main point is clear: The true basis of the market system is not the
product market, the labor market, or the managerial market, but the capital market,
where entrepreneurial judgments are exercised and decisions carried out.15
Mises’s treatment of the importance of financial markets is also the key to his
final rebuttal in Human Action to Lange, Lerner, and the other market-socialist
critics of his calculation argument (Mises 1949, pp. 698–715). The market social-
ists, he argued, fail to understand that the main task performed by a market system
is not the pricing of consumer goods, but the allocation of financial capital among
the various branches of industry. By focusing on production and pricing decisions
within a given structure of capital, the socialists ignore the vital role of capital
markets.
TOWARD AN AUSTRIAN THEORY OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
Given that financial-market entrepreneurship is the defining feature of a market
economy, that economic calculation is the capitalist–entrepreneur’s primary tool,
and that economic calculation requires well-functioning capital markets, what can
capitalist–entrepreneurs do to govern their relationships with operational manag-
ers? What should be the basis of an Austrian theory of corporate governance? This
section suggests four areas that Austrians should address: (1) the concept of the
firm as an investment; (2) the relationship between internal and external capital
markets; (3) comparative corporate governance; and (4) financiers as entrepre-
neurs. Consider each in turn.
15Compare Rothbard (1962, p. 538):
Hired managers may successfully direct production or choose production proc-
esses. But the ultimate responsibility and control of production rests inevitably with the
owner, with the businessman whose property the product is until it is sold. It is the
owners who make the decision concerning how much capital to invest and in what
particular processes. And particularly, it is the owners who must choose the managers.
The ultimate decisions concerning the use of their property and the choice of the men to
manage it must therefore be made by the owners and by no one else.
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Firms as Investments
Because the owner, and not the manager, is the ultimate decisionmaker, the
Austrian theory of the firm should comprise two elements: a theory of investment
(corporate finance), and a theory of how investors provide incentives for managers to
use these resources efficiently (corporate governance). In microeconomics text-
books, by contrast, what the capital investors give to the firm is treated as just another
factor of production. Its price, the “rental price of capital” or interest, is simply another
cost to the producer. Any excess of revenues over costs, including the cost of capital,
goes to the manager (sometimes confusingly called the “entrepreneur”). This residual
is called “profit,” though it is not profit in the Misesian sense. 
In the ownership perspective, as developed by Gabor and Pearce (1952,
1958), Vickers (1970, 1987), Moroney (1972), and others, the firm is viewed as an
investment. The firm’s goal is to maximize the return on invested capital. This money
capital may be regarded as a factor of production, but it is a unique factor, the
“controlling” factor that receives the net proceeds of the operation. Other factors,
such as labor (including management) and physical capital, are regarded as “contract-
ing” factors that receive a fixed payment. The services of the top-level manager are
thus treated as a cost, while the investor is considered the residual claimant. Also note
that because the capitalist bears the risk that the investment will fail, upon investing the
capitalist has become an entrepreneur. Furthermore, to the extent that the entre-
preneur (as Kirznerian discoverer) hires himself out to the capitalist as a salaried
manager, his compensation is not entrepreneurial profit; it is a cost to the owner of
the firm (Rothbard 1985, p. 283).This has significant implications for firm behavior.
First, the firm will not always expand output to the point where marginal revenue
equals marginal cost. For if the firm is earning positive net returns at its current level
of output, instead of increasing output until marginal net returns fall to zero, the
firm could simply take those returns and employ them elsewhere, either to set up a
new firm in the same industry or to diversify into a new industry (Gabor and Pearce
1952, p. 253). The efficient scale of production is determined by outside invest-
ment opportunities, not simply the marginal returns from producing a single
output. 
Indeed, it is easy to show that under fairly weak assumptions, the output level
that maximizes the profit rate is less than the output level that maximizes the level
of profit. Consider a standard, concave profit function; add a “money capital
requirement,” the amount of capital required to finance a given level of output. As
long as the money capital requirement is increasing in output, the output level that
maximizes the profit rate—profit divided by the money capital required to finance
that output level—is less than the output level that maximizes profit. From the
capitalist’s perspective, output should be expanded to the point where the return
on the last dollar of money capital is just equal to the opportunity cost of that last
dollar of money capital. But as long as the plant manager is not free to invest his
financial capital elsewhere, the manager’s cost curves do not reflect this opportu-
nity cost. Hence, the manager chooses a higher output level than that which
maximizes the capitalist’s return.
Significantly, for internal accounting purposes, firms are typically structured
such that the goal of any operating unit is to maximize the return on its invested
capital. In fact, not only do firms set up divisions as profit centers, as discussed
above, but groups of profit centers are frequently grouped together as “investment
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centers” within the firm itself. Reece and Cool (1978) studied 620 of the largest
U.S. firms in 1978 and found that seventy-four percent had investment centers.
These subunits are commonly evaluated according to a return-on-investment
(ROI) criterion, such as the ratio of accounting net income generated by the
investment center divided by total assets invested in the investment center. More
recently, measures such as residual income and “economic value added” (EVA)
have become popular as an alternative to ROI (Stern, Stewart, and Chew 1995).
The point is that individual divisions are being evaluated on the same basis as the
corporation itself—namely, what kind of return is being generated on the financial
resources invested.
Second, the firm-as-investment concept relates closely to an emerging litera-
ture on merger as a form of firm-level investment (Bittlingmayer 1996; Andrade
and Stafford 1997). Once managers have acquired financial resources from
capitalists, these managers have some discretion over how to invest those re-
sources. To supplement the “normal” forms of firm-level investment—capital ex-
penditures and R&D—managers may choose to purchase assets of existing firms
through merger. Merger may be a different form of investment; Andrade and
Stafford (1997) find, for example, that mergers in particular industries tend to be
clustered over time, while rankings of non-merger forms of investment by industry
tend to remain constant. This suggests that merger activity is encouraged by
specific industry or policy shocks, like deregulation, the emergence of junk-bond
financing, and increased foreign competition (Mitchell and Mulherin 1996). None-
theless, mergers will be evaluated by the returns they generate, just like any other
investment.
Internal Capital Markets
In his extension of the Coasian framework, Williamson (1975, 1981) describes
the modern multidivisional or “M-form” corporation as a means of intra-firm
capital allocation. Capital markets allocate resources between stand alone, single-
product firms. In the diversified, multidivisional firm, by contrast, resources are
allocated internally, as the entrepreneur distributes funds among profit-center
divisions. This “internal capital market” replicates the allocative and disciplinary
roles of the financial markets, shifting resources toward more profitable lines of
production.16 Coase claimed that firms “supplant” markets when the transaction
costs of market exchange exceed those of internal production. Williamson adds
16Such a process is described explicitly in the 1977 Annual Report of Fuqua Industries, a diversi-
fied firm with interests in lawn and garden equipment, sports and recreation, entertainment, photofin-
ishing, transportation, housing, and food and beverages:
Fuqua’s strategy is to allocate resources into business segments having prospects of
the highest return on investment and to extract resources from areas where the
future return on investment does not meet our ongoing requirements. . . . The same
principle of expanding areas of high return and shrinking areas of low return is
constantly extended to product lines and markets within individual Fuqua opera-
tions. Only with a diversified business structure is the application of this modern
fundamental business investment policy practical.
Another highly diversified firm, Bangor Punta Corporation, explains that the role of its corporate
headquarters is “to act as a central bank supplying operating units with working capital and capital
funds” (1966 Annual Report).
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that diversified, multidivisional firms “supplant” capital markets when the costs of
external finance exceed those of internal resource allocation. 
According to the internal capital markets theory, diversified firms arise when
limits in the capital market permit internal management to allocate and manage
funds more efficiently than the external capital market. These efficiencies may
come from several sources. First, the central headquarters of the firm (HQ)
typically has access to information unavailable to external parties, which it extracts
through its own internal auditing and reporting procedures (Williamson 1975, pp.
145–47).17 Second, managers inside the firm may also be more willing to reveal
information to HQ than to outsiders, since revealing the same information to the
capital market would also reveal it to rival firms, potentially hurting the firm’s
competitive position. Third, HQ can also intervene selectively, making marginal
changes to divisional operating procedures, whereas the external market can
discipline a division only by raising or lowering the share price of the entire firm.
Fourth, HQ has residual rights of control that providers of outside finance do not
have, making it easier to redeploy the assets of poorly performing divisions
(Gertner, Scharfstein, and Stein 1994). More generally, these control rights allow
HQ to add value by engaging in “winner picking” among competing projects
when credit to the firm as a whole is constrained (Stein 1997). Fifth, the internal
capital market may react more “rationally” to new information: those who dis-
pense the funds need only take into account their own expectations about the
returns to a particular investment, and not their expectations about other inves-
tors’ expectations. Hence there would be no speculative bubbles or waves.
Bhide (1990) uses the internal capital markets framework to explain both the
conglomerate merger wave of the 1960s and the divestitures of the 1980s,
regarding these developments as responses to changes in the relative efficiencies
of internal and external finance. For instance, corporate refocusing can be ex-
plained as a consequence of the rise of takeover by tender offer rather than proxy
contest, the emergence of new financial techniques and instruments like leveraged
buyouts and high-yield bonds, and the appearance of takeover and breakup
specialists, like Kohlberg Kravis Roberts, which themselves performed many func-
tions of the conglomerate HQ (Williamson 1992). Furthermore, the emergence of
the conglomerate in the 1960s can itself be traced to the emergence of the M-form
corporation. Because the multidivisional structure treats business units as semi-in-
dependent profit or investment centers, it is much easier for an M-form corpora-
tion to expand via acquisition than it is for the older unitary structure. New
acquisitions can be integrated smoothly when they can preserve much of their
internal structure and retain control over day-to-day operations. In this sense, the
conglomerate could emerge only after the multidivisional structure had been
diffused widely throughout the corporate sector.
Internal capital market advantages, then, explain why diversification can increase
the value of the firm. During the 1960s, entrepreneurs took advantage of financial-
market imperfections (many due to regulatory interference) to form large, highly
diversified firms (Hubbard and Palia 1999; Klein 1998b). They also benefited from
17Myers and Majluf (1984) show that if the information asymmetry between a stand-alone firm
and potential outside investors is large enough, the firm may forego investments with positive net
present value rather than issue risky securities to finance them.
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government spending in high-technology and other defense-related businesses,
which were particularly suited for acquisition. In the two subsequent decades,
financial-market performance improved, reducing the internal capital market ad-
vantages of conglomerate firms.
If entrepreneurs have a special ability to manage information and allocate
financial resources within the firm—if diversified firms “supplant” external capital
markets—then why are capital markets necessary at all? Why not, to paraphrase
Coase’s (1937, pp. 42–43) second question, organize the entire economy as one
giant conglomerate? The answer is that the argument for internal capital market
advantages does not “scale up”; it applies only to firms that are themselves
engaged in rivalrous competition. This situation, in turn, implies strict limits to firm
size, even for large conglomerates.
The argument for the efficiency of internal capital markets is that compared
with outside investors, the entrepreneur can extract additional information about
divisional requirements and performance. It is not that the entrepreneur’s knowl-
edge substitutes for the knowledge embodied in market prices. To evaluate the
merit of a proposed investment, the central management of a diversified con-
glomerate still relies on market prices to calculate expected (money) benefits
and cost. Internal accounting does not substitute for money prices; it merely
uses the information contained in prices in a particular way. When capital-
goods prices are distorted—for example, because of financial market regula-
tion—then the entrepreneur’s additional knowledge is that much more valuable.
So under those conditions we would expect an increase in M-form corporations,
allocating resources via internal capital markets. During the 1960s, that is exactly
what we observed.
Correctly understood, the internal capital markets hypothesis does not state
that internal capital markets supplant financial markets. It states that internal capital
markets supplement financial markets. Even ITT’s Harold Geneen, LTV’s James
Ling, Litton’s “Tex” Thornton, and the other conglomerators of the 1960s were
constrained by the need for economic calculation in terms of money prices.
Thornton’s “Whiz Kids” have been criticized for their advocacy of “scientific
management” or “management by the numbers.” Yet Thornton’s techniques were
quite successful at Litton. It was only when his disciple Robert McNamara tried to
apply the same techniques to a nonmarket setting—the Vietnam War—that the
limitations of “scientific management” were revealed.18
Comparative Corporate Governance
How well do various systems of corporate governance function? The last few
years have seen the growth of a new literature on “comparative corporate govern-
ance,” the study of alternative means of governing relations between firm owners
and managers. The typical comparison is between stock-market systems like those
in the U.S. and U.K., and bank-centered systems like those in Germany and Japan
(Roe 1994, 1998; Gilson and Black 1997; Milhaupt 1997). According to Roe, the
phenomenon he calls “strong managers, weak owners” is an outgrowth not of the
market process, but of legal restrictions on firm ownership and control. In the U.S., for
example, banks and other institutions are forbidden from owning firms; antitrust laws
18For more on the relationship between Thornton and McNamara, see Shapley (1993), and
Byrne (1993).
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prohibit industrial combinations like the Japanese keiretsu; and anti-takeover
restrictions dilute the effects of the takeover mechanism. Laws that require diffuse
ownership create what Roe terms the “Berle–Means corporation,” in which
“fragmented ownership shifts power in the firm to managers” (p. 93). 
Mises makes a very similar argument in Human Action. There he notes that “the
emergence of an omnipotent managerial class is not a phenomenon of the unham-
pered market economy,” but a result of government policy (Mises 1949, p. 307). Here
he expands upon his earlier analysis in Bureaucracy (1944, p. 12), where he attacks
the claim that bureaucracy follows naturally from firm size. Mises conceives of
bureaucracy as rule-following, as opposed to profit-seeking, behavior. He reserves
the term “bureaucratic management” for the governing of activities that have no
cash value on the market. As long as a firm’s inputs and outputs are bought and
sold, the central management of the firm will have the information provided by
market prices to evaluate the efficiency of the various branches and divisions
within the firm. Then subordinate managers can be given wide discretion to make
daily operational decisions without the pursuit of profit.19 If an organization
produces a good or service that has no market price—the output of a government
agency, for example—then subordinate managers must be given specific instruc-
tions for how to perform their tasks. 
The fact that managers in a private firm have latitude to make day-to-day
decisions, Mises argues, does not make the firm “bureaucratic.” “[N]o profit-seek-
ing enterprise, no matter how large, is liable to become bureaucratic provided the
hands of its management are not tied by government interference. The trend
toward bureaucratic rigidity is not inherent in the evolution of business. It is an
outcome of government meddling with business” (Mises 1944, p. 12). By this
Mises means that government interference impedes the entrepreneur’s use of
economic calculation and the attempt to use prices to impose managerial disci-
pline. Mises gives three examples (pp. 64–73): taxes and price regulations that
interfere with corporate profits (distorting an important signal of managerial
performance); laws that interfere with hiring and promotion (including the
need to hire public relations staffs and legal and accounting personnel to
comply with government reporting requirements); and the omnipresent threat
of arbitrary antitrust or regulatory activity, in response to which entrepreneurs
must become adept at “diplomacy and bribery” (p. 72). The effect of legal
restrictions on corporate governance and organizational form is an important
and growing area, and further research from an Austrian perspective is sorely
needed.
Financiers as Entrepreneurs
As discussed above, the market for corporate control places strict limits on the
ability of managers to pursue their own goals rather than those of the capitalist–en-
trepreneurs. However, in the mainstream literature at least, there is much debate
19Chapter 1 of Bureaucracy, on profit management and the sources of entrepreneurial profit,
contains a remarkably lucid account of economic calculation under capitalism and its impossibility
under socialism. “To the entrepreneur of capitalist society a factor of production through its price
sends out a warning: Don’t touch me, I am earmarked for another, more urgent need. But under
socialism these factors of production are mute” (Mises 1944, p. 29). 
Mises also provides a very Coase-like discussion of the make-or-buy decision, though without
citation (p. 33).
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about the effectiveness of the takeover mechanism in providing managerial disci-
pline.20 If managers desire acquisitions to increase their own prestige or span of
control—to engage in “empire building”—then an unregulated market will generate
too many takeovers. Indeed, several studies have found a sharp divergence
between market participants’ pre-merger expectations about the post-merger
performance of merging firms, and the firms’ actual performance rates. Raven-
scraft and Scherer’s (1987) large-scale study of manufacturing firms, for example,
found that while the share prices of merging firms did on average rise with the
announcement of the proposed restructuring, post-merger profit rates were unim-
pressive. They find that nearly one-third of all acquisitions during the 1960s and
1970s were eventually divested. Ravenscraft and Scherer conclude that mergers
typically promote empire building rather than efficiency, and they support in-
creased restrictions on takeover activity. Jensen (1986, 1993) suggests changes in
the tax code to favor dividends and share repurchases over direct reinvestment,
thus limiting managers’ ability to channel free cash flow into unproductive acquisi-
tions.
However, the fact that some mergers—indeed, many mergers, takeovers, and
reorganizations—turn out to be unprofitable does not imply market failure or
necessarily prescribe any policy response. Errors will always be made in a world of
uncertainty. Even the financial markets, which aggregate the collective wisdom of
the capitalist–entrepreneurs, will sometimes make the wrong judgment on a
particular business transaction. Sometimes the market will reward, ex ante, a
proposed restructuring that has no efficiency rationale. But this is due not to
capital market failure, but to imperfect knowledge. Final judgments about success
and failure can be made only ex post, as the market process plays itself out.
Moreover, there is no reason to believe that courts or regulatory authorities can
make better judgments than the financial markets. The decisions of courts and
government agencies will, in fact, tend to be far worse: unlike market participants,
judges and bureaucrats pursue a variety of private agendas, unrelated to eco-
nomic efficiency. Furthermore, the market is quick to penalize error as it is
discovered; no hearings, committees, or fact-finding commissions are required. In
short, that firms often fail is surprising only to those committed to textbook models
of competition in which the very notion of “failure” is defined away. 
Another criticism of the market for corporate control is that unregulated
financial markets engage in too few takeovers, due to a free-rider problem associ-
ated with tender offers (see, for example, Scharfstein 1988). Critics point out that if
the difference between the current (undervalued) price of the firm and its after-
takeover market value is common knowledge, then the target firm’s shareholders
will refuse to tender their shares until the current price is bid up, appropriating a
share of the returns to the acquiring firm. These critics conclude that regulation,
not the takeover market, should be used to discipline managers.
The flaw in this argument is that it assumes perfect knowledge on the part of
investors. The typical shareholder will not usually have the same information as
incumbent managers, outside “raiders,” and other specialists. It is not in the small
shareholder’s interest to learn these details; that is why he delegates such responsibilities
20For overviews of this literature see Romano (1992), Shleifer and Vishny (1997), and Zingales
(1998).
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to the managers in the first place. As Hayek (1945) described it, there is a “division
of knowledge” in society. The raider who discovers a difference between a firm’s
current market value and its potential value under new management has an
opportunity for an entrepreneurial profit (less the transaction costs of takeover).
Because shareholders have delegated these responsibilities, they will not usually
earn a share of this profit. Nonetheless, as Rothbard (1962, p. 372) observes,
because shareholders (owners) choose to delegate operational responsibility to
managers—contracting out for the managerial function—they themselves retain the
ultimate rights of control.
Moreover, the post-takeover market value of the firm is uncertain; the raider’s
profit, if he is successful, is the reward for bearing this uncertainty. In this sense, the
takeover artist is a Misesian capitalist–entrepreneur. This account, however, could
use further elaboration. For example, how is the bearing of uncertainty distributed
among participants in various forms of restructuring? How do regulatory barriers
hamper the capitalist–entrepreneur’s ability to exercise the entrepreneurial func-
tion in this context?
CONCLUSIONS
The main message of this article is that Austrians can continue to work within the
contractual, or Coasian, approach to the firm in elaborating the insights discussed
above. In particular, the problem of corporate governance, and the corollary view
that firms are investments, belongs at the forefront of Austrian research on the
theory of the firm. Emphasis should thus be placed on the plans and actions of the
capitalist–entrepreneur.
A particularly undeveloped area concerns the provision of capital to small,
“entrepreneurial” ventures. Most of the literature on governance focuses on the
large corporation, and the use of stock and bond markets to govern these
organizations. Equally important, however, are smaller, privately held firms, fi-
nanced with venture capital or other forms of investment. So far, the firm-as-invest-
ment literature has said little about these organizations, despite their growing
importance, particularly in high-growth, technologically-advanced industries like
software and biotechnology. Further research in this area is sorely needed.
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